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Abstract. We ask whether the three domains proposed in Information Domains 
(individual, social, and signification) can provide a useful framework for analyz-
ing distributed morality (DM) and its potential consequences. DM is present 
when moral responsibility is distributed across human and artificial agents. The 
affordances of information and communications technologies (ICTs) have inten-
sified interaction between human and artificial moral agents, which has in turn 
fundamentally altered our concepts of morality and its agency. 21st century moral 
responsibility is increasingly distributed across human and artificial agents. In 
our “always onlife” world [1], all actions can be combined into good or evil re-
sults without human review or recourse. The inclusion of artificial moral agents 
problematizes the assumption of traditional ethics that agency (and therefore, ac-
countability) is either individual or social. In artificial agents, we witness the re-
ontologization of both the infosphere and the ecosphere [1, 2].  
Artificial intelligence is a form of re-ontologized signification that may be 
said to influence or even pre-determine human moral decision-making. Artificial 
agents may perform actions that have moral consequences, but can we hold them 
accountable for these consequences? What does that even mean? 
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1  Introduction 
1.1 Statement of Purpose 
We propose to initiate a conversation about whether analysis of distributed morality 
(DM) using the Information Domains framework contributes to better understanding of 
how artificial agents function in our “always onlife” society.  
“Onlife” is a neologism coined by Luciano Floridi as early as 2012, and refers to the 
point in time after which it no longer makes sense to talk about human activity taking 
place “online” or  “offline.” The poster introduces the Information Domains framework 
and invites conference attendees to explore and assess its potential for enriching our 
understanding of how the inclusion of artificial agents in moral decision-making affects 
distributed morality. Floridi [3] describes DM as the moral consequences of increas-
ingly intensive interaction between human and artificial moral agents. The introduction 
of artificial intelligence among the affordances of ICTs has fundamentally altered moral 
  
agency in the 21st century.  The presence of artificial intelligence problematizes the 
assumptions of traditional ethics that moral agency is fundamentally human, and that 
moral responsibility is either individual or social.   
 
1.2 Research Question & Method 
We ask whether the three domains proposed in the Information Domains framework—
individual, social, and signification—can provide a useful framework for the analysis 
of distributed morality (DM) and its potential consequences. The framework has previ-
ously been applied successfully to the exploration of the ethics of cyberbullying and 
immigration control, where the digital creates new affordances that influence individual 
and social behavior through the acceptance and adoption of new forms of signification. 
The potential effects of the participation of artificial agents and intelligence in “always 
onlife” information societies was not considered in this earlier application.  
2 Information Domains 
Information Domains is proposed as a framework for understanding how distributed 
morality changes in our understanding of agency and responsibility, particularly in the 
context of hyperconnected information societies, where both human and artificial 
agents may contribute to the moral decision-making. 
Information domains, first outlined in Burnett, G. [4] draws upon previous work in 
theory, e.g. [5-7] as well as cultural and philosophical hermeneutics, e.g. [8-11]. It in-
cludes three “domains,” outlined below. While the three domains – individual, social, 
and signification – look back to the history of LIS literature, they also, we argue, have 
the potential to illuminate current issues in information behavior and information eth-
ics. 
 
2.1 Domain of the Individual 
Within the domain of the individual, three factors play predominant roles: First, each 
individual perceives the world – as well as their own particular information needs – 
through their own unique cognitive characteristics, often defined, as in Belkin [12] and 
Dervin [13] as an anomalous state of knowledge or an information gap; individuals seek 
information to bridge this gap. Second, individuals experience information needs and 
the process of information seeking through the filter of their own emotions (see, e.g. 
Kulthau [14]. And, finally, individuals interact with the world through their own par-
ticular physical characteristics, ranging from simple things such as height to more com-
plex characteristics often defined as disabilities; for example, specific personal charac-
teristics such as blindness or confinement to a wheelchair have direct implications for 
an individual’s ability to search for, find, and use information. 
 
  
2.2 Domain of the Social 
The work of Chatman (e.g. [15-18] and her co-authors [5] turns away from a concep-
tualization of the individual as the center of information-related phenomena, emphasiz-
ing social factors as the shapers of information behavior within what she called small 
worlds. However, Chatman relies on an extremely constrained notion of the boundaries 
around those worlds, arguing that, while individual behaviors are meaningful only 
within their localized social worlds, such worlds are, themselves, isolated entities al-
lowing few, if any influences from external forces into their settings [5].  
Melding Chatman’s work with Habermas’ notion of the lifeworld – a culture-wide 
sum of all available information resources and channels within which both individuals 
and smaller social worlds are situated—the theory of information worlds [19] proposes 
that, while individual characteristics play important roles in information behaviors, all 
information-related activities are also inextricably socially situated; the theory further 
proposes that worlds are not all small, but exist at a wide variety of scales and sizes, 
from the absolutely localized (e.g. small families) to the global, and that these many 
“information worlds” interact with and influence each other in a variety of ways across 
different types of boundaries. Through social interaction, particular information worlds 
maintain their own social norms (commonly agreed-upon standards governing accepta-
ble forms of observable behavior) and information value (agreed-upon scales for as-
sessing the relative importance of different kinds of information and the ways in which 
such information may be valued). 
 
2.3 Domain of Signification 
Human users of information, whether conceptualized as individuals or as social groups, 
do not interact with information as an abstraction, but always as something encoded 
and communicated in some way via a material system of representation, whether writ-
ing, visualization, or some other medium for recording and storing—in a very literal 
sense, Buckland’s Information as Thing [20].  Information cannot be usefully concep-
tualized, sought, retrieved, or used without the mediation of representational practices. 
 
2.4 Entwined Domains 
These three domains—the individual, the social, and signification— are inextricably 
intertwined with one another.  Individuals occupy social worlds and interact with one 
another through the mediation of signification.  Conversely, the domain of the social is 
the context within which individuals live, exchange information, and engage with each 
other through signification and representational practices. 
One implication of this is that information itself is neither static nor disengaged, but 
is, rather, one component of a complex process of interaction, mediation, and creation 
of meaning involving all three domains. In particular, information ethics, to which we 
now turn our attention, is a locus of interaction between individuals and other individ-
uals, between individuals and social collectives, and across different social groupings; 
  
signification practices hold the entire process together and makes it work. In what fol-
lows, we examine two issues related to information ethics, informed by the three infor-
mation domains. 
3 Information Ethics and Distributed Morality 
3.1 Information Ethics 
Information ethics explores the relationship between the creation, organization, dissem-
ination, and use of information, and the ethical standards and moral codes governing 
human conduct. In the past we have used technologies to facilitate and empower our 
individual information behaviors, operating from the assumption that technology is eth-
ically neutral, and is always human-directed. Recent experience suggests that this as-
sumption is no longer viable. Who is responsible when a trolling bot bullies a vulnera-
ble individual? What recourse does the vulnerable individual have against this virtually-
instantiated terrorization? In the context of a social media platform, how do we distin-
guish the actions of an artificial intelligence from those of a human participant? Is this 
even possible, and ultimately, does it even matter? A human is terrorized either way.  
 
3.2 Distributed Morality (DM) 
According to Floridi [3], one of the unexpected consequences of living “always onlife” 
is that morality is inevitably and unavoidably distributed across human and artificial 
agents.  “ICTs are a most influential empowering factor behind the emergence of DM, 
working as powerful moral enablers …” [3], p. 270.  Traditional ethics theories assign 
moral responsibility to human individuals or groups. Lay ethics sometimes assigns re-
sponsibility to animals, but rarely to objects.  
What happens when objects are repurposed to represent (or signify) agents from the 
individual and social domains, and are imbued with intelligence? These objects, or ar-
tificial agents, act within these domains. Even if we assume that they are incapable of 
moral decision-making, their actions may have moral consequences.  
 
3.3 The Amazon Case 
Amazon announced in 2018 that they were abandoning the use of adaptive artificial 
intelligence in screening job applications. According to a Reuter’s Business News story 
[21], a team at Amazon had begun building computer programs in 2014 with the aim 
of achieving gender-neutral hiring practices, using AI to rate candidates using a rating 
system similar to the one used by Amazon shoppers to rate products. Within a year, 
they realized that the resulting ratings were far from  gender-neutral; in fact, the AI was 
penalizing candidates who had attended women’s colleges or participated in women’s 
clubs or sports. In other words, it discerned differences between the candidates’ re-
sumes and those contained in the training database, and interpreted these differences as 
signifying negative values.  Three years of retraining brought little improvement, and 
Amazon scrapped the project.   
  
The team began with the assumption that an AI would provide unbiased analyses of 
the candidates’ resumes, but  found that it was easier to teach an AI human bias than 
moral discernment. Artificial intelligence is a new form of signification about which 
we still have a lot to learn.  As we are learning, we need to monitor its interactions and 
their affects across the individual and social domains.  
While it is clear that AI screening did not contribute to Amazon reaching its goal of 
gender equity, it is unclear whether there was potential for even greater harm. At the 
individual level, resumes of some of the most qualified candidates would never have 
reached recruiters, and many qualified female candidates would have been excluded 
from the hiring process and even from the opportunity to earn incomes and fulfill their 
potential in the industry; some may have been diverted to jobs in entirely different areas 
of the economy.  They may have been excluded from participating in the development 
of products that might have helped other women to succeed, and therefore, have been 
denied a sense of fulfilment that they might otherwise achieved. In other words, deci-
sions rooted entirely in automating the domain of signification had real impact on indi-
vidual lives. 
There would likely be significant consequences in the domain of the social. Gender 
equity at Amazon would have remained an unattainable goal, but, more broadly, the 
underrepresentation of women in IT in the U.S. would not have improved, and the rea-
sons for their underemployment might be further obscured.  The lack of participation 
by women in the company and the industry as a whole might affect gender equity in 
product availability as well as employment. This would reinforce existing barriers to 
women’s participation in IT and in advanced information societies more broadly; AI, 
as a tool of signification, would have significant impact on both the lives of individuals 
and on the social domain as a whole.   
4 Invitation to Participate 
The goal of this poster is to start a conversation about whether the Information Domains 
framework can be applied to the analysis of how the incorporation of artificial agents 
into the infosphere may affect our “always onlife” information society. Here are some 
questions to get us started: 
 
1. Individual Domain: What impacts do you see in your own life from the 
incorporation of artificial agents in our “always onlife” information soci-
ety?  
2. Social Domain: What about the ways that you interact with others in social 
groups and organizations? Has that changed? Are artificial agents a part of 
that change? 
3. Signification Domain: Is there something fundamentally different about 
AI? Does it change the way we interact? Is an artificial agent capable of 
moral discernment? If no, what does it mean to interact with an amoral 
agent? If yes, can we trust artificial agents to make such decisions?  
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